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Abstract
Background: Patient genomic data are rapidly becoming part of clinical decision making. Within
a few years, full genome expression profiling and genotyping will be affordable enough to perform
on every individual. The management of such sizeable, yet fine-grained, data in compliance with
privacy laws and best practices presents significant security and scalability challenges.
Results: We present the design and implementation of GenePING, an extension to the PING
personal health record system that supports secure storage of large, genome-sized datasets, as well
as efficient sharing and retrieval of individual datapoints (e.g. SNPs, rare mutations, gene expression
levels). Even with full access to the raw GenePING storage, an attacker cannot discover any stored
genomic datapoint on any single patient. Given a large-enough number of patient records, an
attacker cannot discover which data corresponds to which patient, or even the size of a given
patient's record. The computational overhead of GenePING's security features is a small constant,
making the system usable, even in emergency care, on today's hardware.
Conclusion: GenePING is the first personal health record management system to support the
efficient and secure storage and sharing of large genomic datasets. GenePING is available online at
http://ping.chip.org/genepinghtml, licensed under the LGPL.
Background
Genomic data for clinical decision making
Genomic data are becoming a routine component of clin-
ical diagnosis and treatment. Prospective parents with
familial or ethnic history of genetic disease have long been
encouraged to undergo genetic counseling, including gen-
otyping for disease alleles such as Tay-Sachs and Cystic
Fibrosis [1,2]. Recent research [3], demonstrating that sev-
eral treatment responses are conditional on genomic pro-
file, promises to usher in the long-awaited era of
personalized medicine, all based on the patient's gene
sequence or gene expression signature.
Clinically pertinent genomic data extends far beyond the
patient's somatic genome sequence. Advanced cancer
treatment options include genetic testing of cancer cells
for specific markers, e.g. estrogen receptors in breast can-
cer or the Philadelphia chromosome in CML [4]. This type
of diagnostic will likely expand into full genomic profil-
ing of cancer cells to help determine appropriate treat-
ment [5]. In addition, much recent literature has
uncovered correlations between gene expression patterns
and clinical diagnosis [6,7]. While genome sequence data
changes rarely, gene expression data varies across cell
types and time. The cost of both diagnostic tests is falling
rapidly with high-throughput techniques [8]. It is likely
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that all patients will be genotyped at some point in their
lives, and that gene expression levels will be measured for
many serious ailments. Concurrently with these signifi-
cant technical developments, the Internet has made
patients markedly more autonomous in medical decision
making, perhaps even more knowledgeable than care pro-
viders, particularly in the realm of genetic testing [9-12].
A new type of clinical data
Currently, the most efficient way to genotype "most of"a
human being is to genotype tag SNPs according to the
HapMap [13], which is expected to highlight close to
600,000 SNPs that identify most of the clinically-useful
genetic diversity. In addition, specific, larger mutations
need to be checked, including large deletions or inser-
tions. Considering necessary redundancy for indexing of
partial records, the size of a single patient's genome
sequence might quickly reach 3 or 4 megabytes. Gene
expression level datasets like the popular Affymetrix U133
Plus 2.0 platform [14] consider close to 54,000 RNA tran-
scripts, which requires approximately 500 kilobytes of
storage, including indexing. For long-term quality assur-
ance, one may want to store raw instrumentation data,
which increases the size of a single transcriptome to 12
megabytes. The size of these data, though much larger
than typical diagnostic tests, is not entirely unprece-
dented: MRIs and other imaging results can require many
megabytes of storage, too. The key difference is in the
granularity of the data. While an MRI is generally shared
as an atomic block of data, a patient will not likely want
to share his entire genomic data, as it has been shown that
a mere 20 randomly chosen SNPs are enough for unique,
perpetual identification [15]. Instead, within these tens of
megabytes of genomic data, a patient might want to share
a few SNPs with his doctor, nothing more. Even the exist-
ence of test results against other SNPs, particularly as the
genomic tests are not yet complete scans of the HapMap,
should remain private.
Thus, genomic data should be treated as a very large
sequence of small results. Each result is clinically mean-
ingful (e.g. a BRCA1 allele), and a small handful of results
is enough to genomically fingerprint an individual. In
other words, the management of genomic data presents a
significant challenge: how can we efficiently store and
retrieve patient genomic data while respecting strong pri-
vacy constraints?
Implementation
Extension of PING
GenePING, as its name implies, is an extension to the Per-
sonal Internetworked Notary and Guardian (PING)
health record management system [16,17]. PING allows
patients and health-care providers to share health record
data with access control rules defined by the patient. All
data is exchanged in XML with publicly-defined schemas,
and the protocol is implemented using XML over HTTP
(preferably HTTPS). The data store itself persists as a set of
encrypted objects, thereby reducing the threat of disclo-
sure from discarded or mismanaged disk drives that have
been widely reported [18]. PING also includes a Java cli-
ent, PING Display, which GenePING also extends to
present the user interface. Other groups are developing
alternative open source PING clients, including ones that
use dynamic HTML. On the back-end, GenePING is a
revamp of the PING low-level storage and high-level med-
ical document organization, in order to enable the secure
storage of fine-grained genomic data. The threat model is
left unchanged: the PING server remains a semi-trusted
information broker with the keys to an encrypted data
store. In addition, the new GenePING storage system
addresses the specific threats of genomic data leakage
combined with the efficiency requirements.
On the front-end, GenePING integrates into the default
PING client (Figure 1). Patients can view their genotype
labs listed much as typical lab results (Figure 2). A single
lab can be browsed incrementally, one set of SNPs at a
time (Figure 3).
Data storage
GenePING defines a variable-size, keyed-block, low-level
storage interface. This interface behaves much like a per-
sistent hash table, and the underlying implementation of
this interface is expected to support hundreds of millions
of records. Possible implementations of this storage inter-
face include a raw filesystem, a SQL database, an object
store, or some distributed storage mechanism. The default
GenePING uses Berkeley DB for Java [19], a transactional
block store whose functionality maps closely to the PING
interface API. Before the data is stored via this low-level
interface, it may be altered for various purposes. The
GenePing Store interface supports generic extensions,
each of which can, in turn, modify the name and value of
the stored record. Once these extensions are registered, the
name-and-value changes are applied automatically upon
interaction with the block storage interface. Storage exten-
sions can be particularly useful for data compression, data
encryption, and obfuscation.
Security and obfuscation
The GenePING server requires two cryptographic keys to
find and decrypt its data: an HMAC key [20] for hashta-
ble-name obfuscation, and an AES key [21] for hashtable-
data encryption. Without both these keys, the raw storage
is useless (to an attacker, for example). In a production
GenePING installation, these two keys are expected to be
loaded into RAM from an administrator's secure token.
They should never be stored on disk.BMC Genomics 2006, 7:93 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2164/7/93
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HMAC is typically used to create an authentication "fin-
gerprint" of a message using a secret key. It is often
thought of as a keyed hash function: it is collision resist-
ant, meaning that it is extremely unlikely to ever find two
messages with the same MAC, and it is one-way, meaning
that, given a random MAC value, it is extremely difficult
to identify even a single message whose MAC will match.
The secret key adds a further dimension above and
beyond hash functions: with it, a MAC on any given mes-
sage is easy to compute, but without it, it is nearly impos-
sible.
The HMAC is used to obfuscate the name of any record
sent to the low-level block store. When GenePING wishes
to store a record under the name patient@chip.org, the
actual low-level block store will instead use the name
HMACkey(patient@chip.org). Therefore, without the
HMAC key, it is impossible to determine both whether a
given record corresponds to a given Ping ID, or even
whether a certain Ping ID is stored in the given system.
In order to secure the data, we use straight-forward AES
encryption in CBC mode [22]. Every time a record is
stored via the low-level block interface, the data field is
encrypted using AES with the single storage key and a new,
random initialization vector used only that one time. The
use of a new initialization vector prevents the inherent
redundancy of genomic records from transpiring at the
ciphertext level: two identical SNPs will never be recorded
identically, since their initialization vectors will be differ-
ent. Both the HMAC and AES algorithms are implemented
as extensions to the block-level storage, so that all Gene-
PING calls are automatically passed through these obfus-
cation and security filters.
GenePING main screen Figure 1
GenePING main screen. GenePING fits into the standard PING architecture. This screens shows the main PING screen 
with the added "Genotype Lab" option supported by the GenePING extension.BMC Genomics 2006, 7:93 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2164/7/93
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Securing granular data
Storing individual blocks securely is not enough. A large
block, for example, could inherently reveal the presence of
a genomic dataset, given the uniquely large size of
genomic data. In addition, storing such a large block
would make access to a single SNP extremely inefficient:
the entire genome sequence would need to be decrypted
before the single SNP datapoint becomes available. Thus,
it is crucial to store genomic datasets in small, meaningful
chunks. Ideally, reading one SNP should require reading
little more than just that encrypted datapoint.
For this purpose, we introduce the concept of a secure
array, a mechanism for securely breaking up an array into
its elements, storing them individually, and allowing for
efficient retrieval of individual items, all while obfuscat-
ing the relationship between the elements of that array to
anyone not in possession of the cryptographic storage
keys. In our implementation, a secure array is defined by
a small root block which contains two short pieces of
information: an array size, and a unique HMAC key
arraykey. Each element of the secure array is, as expected,
indexed by its integer position in the array, call it i. The
block that contains the i'th element of the array is then
stored in the low-level block storage under the name com-
puted as HMACarraykey(i). The collision-free property of the
HMAC algorithm guarantees that this strategy will yield
unique locations for any array element. The one-way
property guarantees that two blocks can never be identi-
fied as belonging to the same array.
We then extend the secure array with a secure index,
which is effectively an additional unique HMAC key to
help locate elements of the array according to a different
scheme than the element's integer position. For example,
a SNP element might need to be located by its SNP id.
GenePING genotype lab list view Figure 2
GenePING genotype lab list view. A patient's view of his list of genotype datasets.BMC Genomics 2006, 7:93 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2164/7/93
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Since the element is already stored at a given location
indicated by HMACarraykey, a secure index requires an addi-
tional level of indirection. HMACindexkey(snp123) will
yield the name of a block which will itself point to the real
location of snp123's location.
This technique for secure granular storage allows for effi-
cient browsing of genotype data. While a single record
may contain megabytes of data, individual SNP data
points can be browsed in batches of ten. The decryption
and network transfer is thus also done in batches, either
via a browsing interface or a search interface for specific
SNPs (Figure 3).
Privacy profiles & filtered documents
An additional complication in the personal management
of genomic health records is patient education. While the
average patient will likely understand how to share a
blood test result, sharing genomic data becomes compli-
cated: which SNPs should an individual share with his
doctor? Is it realistic to expect patients to individually per-
mission their SNPs? With hundreds of thousands of
datapoints in a single test, a patient without guidance is
likely to simply give any health care provider complete
access to their genome, a choice that could seriously affect
the user's privacy.
To address this issue, we introduced Privacy Profiles, each a
list of SNPs, rare mutations, and gene names. Each privacy
profile fulfills a given clinical purpose, e.g. "Breast Cancer
Markers" would include all SNPs relevant to genetic breast
cancer predisposition. Privacy profiles are represented
using XML with a public schema. The definition of these
GenePING single genotype lab view Figure 3
GenePING single genotype lab view. A patient's view of one of his genotype datasets. Note the interface that allows 
datapoints to be downloaded in batches, or individually when queried.BMC Genomics 2006, 7:93 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2164/7/93
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profiles can be left to the proper organizations, e.g. patient
advocacy groups or the FDA.
A patient can then apply a privacy profile to any genotype
lab document in GenePING (Figure 4), effectively creating
a new Filtered Document within his record (Figure 5),
which can then be shared with the appropriate health care
provider. Upon reading a patient's record, a health care
provider will only see this new document containing only
the filtered data, not the original, complete genotype doc-
ument (Figure 6). The fact that the document is the result
of a filter is also invisible to anyone other than the patient
himself.
Results & discussion
It is impossible to build a perfectly secure system. Thus, it
is important to understand exactly what the system
should be built to protect, what situations it can handle,
and what situations are out of scope. We defined a threat
model to analyze the GenePING privacy requirements and
ensure that the level of security provided by our imple-
mentation is reasonable.
Threats
We identified three types of individuals who might be
involved in violating security properties of GenePING:
1. external individual: Consider an individual who has
no authorized role in the system and no affiliation with
the GenePING server. Such an individual might try to
access the server and impersonate an authorized user,
eavesdrop on client-server communication on the public
Internet, or actively exploit a bug in the GenePING server
to extract data in unexpected ways (e.g. errors in authenti-
GenePING filtering a document Figure 4
GenePING filtering a document. A patient can choose to create a filtered version of a genotype dataset, according to one 
of a preset list of privacy profiles.BMC Genomics 2006, 7:93 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2164/7/93
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cation procedure.) It appears that all of these issues are
generic to the entire PING system, and that genome data
does not particularly emphasize these threats.
2. authorized user: Consider an authorized user of the
GenePING service. Such a user should have access only to
the information he is explicitly expected to have, either
because the data is his personal health record to begin
with, or because the health record owner has explicitly
granted permission to this user, who might be a health
care provider of the data owner.
Of particular relevance is the threat posed by revealing the
absence or presence of data. Specifically, the presence or
absence of a particular medical datapoint is, in fact, a
datapoint itself (e.g. the presence of an HIV test result in a
patient's record was once used by certain insurance com-
panies as an indicator of at-risk behavior.) In the context
of genomic data, this is particularly relevant: as genotyp-
ing progressively enters the clinical scene, first with tar-
geted genotypes of certain SNPs or mutations, then with
full genotypes for some patients, it becomes important to
hide the existence of a genotype document from a non-
authorized user, and to hide the existence of datapoints
outside those specifically authorized.
3. internal individual: Consider an individual who has
some authorized role with the GenePING server, or some
access to the hardware and software of GenePING for
some period of time. Such an individual is effectively an
"authorized user," as above, with no explicit permissions.
We must be concerned that a malicious internal individ-
ual may steal the GenePING server's hard drive, or copy
some raw files to external storage for later analysis. Much
GenePING permission granting Figure 5
GenePING permission granting. Once this filtered document is created, a patient can grant read permission on this new 
document to his doctor.BMC Genomics 2006, 7:93 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2164/7/93
Page 8 of 10
(page number not for citation purposes)
like the previous use case, such an attack should yield no
specific information concerning the absence or presence
of a particular patient's record, the absence or presence of
specific document types (e.g. genomic sequences) within
the patients' records, or the absence or presence of specific
datapoints (e.g. SNPs) within these documents.
Out-of-scope threats
Given today's practical constraints, we cannot assume a
public-key infrastructure. Thus, we must place some trust
in the GenePING server to administer permissions cor-
rectly. We cannot defend against a corrupted GenePING
server, though of course we attempt to fight off adversaries
who wish to make the GenePING server corrupt. In partic-
ular, while all raw storage is encrypted and the GenePING
server will store the decryption key in memory only, we do
not defend against an adversary clever enough to some-
how steal the decryption key from a running GenePING
server.
Design principles
The above threat outline helps define two immediate
important design principles: the obfuscation of data in
both content and presence, as well as limiting the Gene-
PING server's capabilities to reduce the number potential
attacks.
Obfuscation of data content and presence
Any data present in the system should be obfuscated, both
in terms of content and even presence, unless a user is
explicitly authorized to access such data. This is relevant to
all levels of data storage: a patient's record as a whole, a
GenePING health care provider filtered view Figure 6
GenePING health care provider filtered view. A doctor viewing a patient's records. Note how only one document 
shows up, and no information is available as to whether that document is filtered or not. Comparison with the patient's view 
reveals that it is indeed a filtered document, but a doctor would not learn this from his view on the data.BMC Genomics 2006, 7:93 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2164/7/93
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patient's specific document, or a piece of a patient's docu-
ment.
Authorized users accessing the system via the PingTalk API
will view the existence and content of only authorized
data thanks to the permission filtering of the GenePING
server. Note also that the document filtering capability
described earlier is responsible for obfuscating the pres-
ence of certain granular datapoints (e.g. SNPs) from users
authorized to read some of these datapoints but not oth-
ers.
Internal individuals who surreptitiously access raw PING
storage are thwarted by the combination of encrypted
content and obfuscated block names. Without the appro-
priate cryptographic key material, they cannot make sense
of the stored data beyond the aggregate size of all stored
records on the system.
Limited capabilities as a security feature
It is often forgotten that the more features a system has,
the more security issues it must handle. In particular, one
major threat posed by internal operators of a health-care
system is the capability to perform aggregate data queries,
e.g. a query that determines all patients with a particular
mutation. Importantly, such a feature for aggregate query-
ing is not part of the GenePING scope.
Thus, GenePING is designed such that aggregate opera-
tions are not offered at the API level. In addition, even
with the cryptographic key material, it would be difficult
to perform these aggregate queries, given that GenePING's
index structure is, itself, encrypted. Navigating the data is
efficient only when accessing a particular document of a
particular patient's record.
With a limited API and an internal structure that specifi-
cally makes aggregate queries difficult, GenePING is more
secure from such threats.
Conclusion
GenePING's core mission is to securely store personal
health information and efficiently share it among author-
ized health care providers. It may also serve to enable the
creation of cohorts of genomic "information altruists"
[23] who are willing to share some but not all their clini-
cal and genomic personal characteristics. The system is
accessible rapidly enough to provide emergency care, yet
securely enough to protect patients' privacy in reasonably
practical scenarios. With the rise of genome data in clini-
cal decision making, services like GenePING will become
a necessity.
Availability & requirements
Project name: GenePING
Project home page: http://ping.chip.org/genepinghtml
Operating system(s): platform independent. GenePING
has been tested on Linux, Windows, and Mac OS X.
Programming language: Java 1.4.
Other requirements: requires free/open-source Java tools
JAXB 1.0.2 and Tomcat 4.
License: GNU LGPL
Any restrictions on use by non-academics: None.
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• PING: Personal Internetworked Notary and Guardian
• MAC: Message Authentication Code.
• HMAC: Hash-function Message Authentication Code.
• AES: Advanced Encryption Standard.
• CBC: Cipher-Block Chaining mode.
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